OPTIONS FOR REFORM

We have seen that the hunting industry in Tanzania will be unable to make a meaningful contribution to the national economy until the procedures for allocating hunting blocks are reformed in manner which promotes transparency and public confidence in the system. We now turn to the options for reform. Of the many alternatives available, three offer the best hope of ensuring that the wildlife resources are utilized in a manner which generates sufficient revenue for the wildlife protection and the country's economic welfare while at the same time ensuring accountability and transparency in the allocation of hunting blocks - auction, tender, and allocation by an independent committee.

In an auction system, interested outfitters bid against one another for the right to hunt within particular blocks at a public auction. This would attract those people who are able to offer the highest price for the quota of animals to be hunted annually. The appeal of such a system is that it " helps the government allocate resources to those who value them the most and who will probably use them more productively" (Sizer and Rice: 24).

In order to prevent collusion between outfitters, minimum price bids or "floor prices" can be set (Sizer and Rice: 23). To avoid the risk that this system selects people with financial resources but a poor track record in the industry, the government or the Committee should set minimum standards that must be met before a company would be allowed to participate in auctions. The guiding criteria could include for example, the company's national and international operating record, its relationship with contiguous communities, and its commitment to improve the wildlife sector in the country. Equally, those companies who had violated these standards in the past could be barred by the President, using his powers under Section 22 of the Wildlife Act.

Provision should be made for an affirmative action policy aimed at giving opportunities to local African Tanzanian hunting companies by reserving a certain percentage of hunting blocks to indigenous bidders. Most of these companies started with less capital than their foreign counterparts and are still struggling to establish themselves in the industry. This will ensure that, in the long run, these companies will become well positioned to compete with other companies that are owned or run by foreigners. The remaining blocks should be open for all bidders who are not disqualified by law or presidential disbarment.

Another possible option is a tender system, under which bidders would submit proposals to an adjudicatory committee detailing the prices and services that they would offer if given the tender to perform or run the advertised activity. Allocation of concessions would depend on both the size of the fee offered and the level of services provided.

In order to prevent animals being killed at unsustainable rates the administering authorities should set maximum utilization quotas for hunting blocks under both auction and tender systems. This would be in accordance with the Section 29(e) of the Wildlife Conservation Act's stipulation that the Minister establishes the maximum number of animals that each licensee is authorized to hunt. TAHOA's contention that these systems do not allow for quota setting is inaccurate. Not only is the establishment of quotas mandated by law, it is generally understood to be fully compatible with the use of such systems.

The third option is allocation by independent committee, subject to clear and well-publicized rules. A respected individual with a love and passion for wildlife management could head the committee. The committee should comprise up to eight members drawn from the private sector, reputable business, and wildlife conservation NGOs, government and the judiciary. The committee would be formed by directive of the Minister and would follow his or her guidelines as to how to allocate hunting blocks and set quotas. Members of the committee would have to disclose their relationships with directors of hunting companies. These disclosures should be made publicly available. Committee members would be required to excuse themselves from deciding on any application in which their relatives or business associates had an interest. All documents in the committee's possession should be made available to the public so as to remove the possibility of collusion and nepotism. Violation of these requirements would attract criminal sanctions.