GRANTING HUNTING BLOCKS IN TANZANIA

The Need for Reform

bulletIntroduction
bulletAcknowledgements
bulletThe Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974
bulletThe Regulation of Tourist Hunting
bulletAbuse of Power
bulletNepotism
bulletAbuse of the Presidential Licence
bulletWeaknesses in the Hunting Quota System
bulletThe Lack of Benefit Sharing
you are hereRecent Reform Efforts
bulletOptions for Reform
bulletConclusion
bulletReferences

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RECENT REFORM EFFORTS

Since 1993, the government of Tanzania has carried out a number of studies to determine how to improve management of the wildlife sector, stimulated by its recognition that the revenues generated by this sector fall far short of their potential. The aim has been to increase the number of tourists, many of whom, for a number of reasons, including misinformation about the site of tourist attractions, went to other countries, especially Kenya. In 1993, for example, the government, in collaboration with international NGOs like World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF), African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) and International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) organized a workshop to examine how the contribution of tourist hunting to the national economy could be strengthened. The workshop made many recommendations covering areas such as policy, quota setting, and block allocation. On the issue of quota setting, the workshop recommended that the system be improved by incorporating available census data and designing questionnaires to collect information regarding animal abundance from the game scouts who accompany hunters. Information from outfitters on trophy sizes and information from local communities on animals found in game-controlled areas and open lands should also be included. The workshop also recommended that hunting blocks be allocated using a tender system in which a minimum of five blocks may be allocated to one company (Williams et al.: 125).

In 1994-95 the government commissioned the Wildlife Sector Review Task Force to: (1) explore different approaches for addressing Tanzania's various future conservation requirements; (2) assess several potential alternatives for a restructured sector; and (3) assess the consequences of implementation of the main alternatives. The Task Team found that illegal hunting has led to the almost total elimination of the black rhino population, loss of two-thirds of the elephant population, and increasing losses of buffaloes. The Team found that Protected Areas, like the National Parks and Game Reserves, "have only partially fulfilled their objectives of conserving Tanzania's biological diversity" (MTNRE, 1995: 21). It did not, however, address the issue of the allocation of hunting blocks.

In March 1998, the government promulgated the Wildlife Policy of Tanzania aimed at ushering in changes in wildlife management (MNRT: 20). The policy sought to improve participation in the tourist hunting industry by:

  • ensuring the open and fair allocation of hunting blocks through a system acceptable to the majority of stake-holders that would not prejudice long-term economic returns from tourist hunting to Tanzania;
  • adopting a fee structure formulated and approved by the appropriate wildlife authority;
  • setting sustainable hunting quotas on a scientific basis and monitoring wildlife populations that are hunted;
  • conducting examinations for professional hunters and monitoring their competence in their practice of hunting;
  • enforcing hunting regulations to ensure a high standard of hunting and of trophies;
  • facilitating the timely export of trophies to hunting clients in their home countries.

To put these recommendations into practice, in June 1998 the government held a consultative meeting with TAHOA concerning the government's suggestions for reforming the hunting industry and the mode of allocation of hunting blocks. This move sent a shiver through the hunting industry, especially TAHOA, which strongly opposes any move that will change a system that it maintains has served the nation well. In its address to the Minister of Tourism and Natural Resources in the Stakeholders' Meeting held on 3rd June, 1998, the Chairman of TAHOA was full of praise for the current system, stating:

But we must all remember that the ultimate goal is to conserve and use wildlife not only for our immediate benefits of today but also for the benefit of the children and generations of the future, nationally and globally. …as we speak here today we are happy that we are guided in the right course to this ultimate goal; but solely by the present good system of administration of the tourist hunting industry including the block allocation process" (my emphasis).

The motivation for this comment becomes clearer if one understands the nature of TAHOA. This organization was formed at the request of the Minister in 1988 to improve cooperation between the private and public sectors. Its leaders are well connected to the government, some of whom having been invited into the country by the government itself, and thus are well placed to influence official hunting allocation policy. Gerald Pasanisi, for instance, the Chairman of TAHOA, was invited into the country by the government in 1967. He now owns Gerald Pasanisi Safaris, and his son and nephew manage Tanganyika Wildlife Safari. These connections have enabled leading figures in TAHOA to be allocated more than five blocks and thus place them in a better position to transact business in the country. The Warioba Commission found that in 1996, Gerald Pasanisi Safaris had eight hunting blocks while Tanganyika Wildlife Safaris had six hunting blocks. (Tanzania, 1996: 437-8). TAHOA's defense of the current system is motivated by its leaders' self-interest rather than loyalty to Tanzania. This is apparent in the association's strong opposition to suggestions made by other analysts calling for the introduction of alternative systems like auctioning, tendering, and allocation of hunting blocks by the committee (TAHOA Chairman's Address, 3rd June 1998).

The Wildlife Department has also come out against these proposed reforms. In May 1998, the Department assembled its experts to consider how allocation of hunting blocks should be made. In that meeting, the experts reviewed a number of options and admitted that the current allocation system needed to be reviewed so as to make it just, transparent, and acceptable, and to safeguard the interest of conservation. This finding, however, was not taken to its logical conclusion - that the current system needs fundamental change. Rather, tenders, lotteries, and auctions were presented as a great danger to the sustainable management of wildlife. The experts said:

Allocation of the hunting blocks by the Director/Department is seen to be the best method, mostly because of having [sic] greater knowledge of the resources, reduced bureaucracy, certainty of accountability, is acceptable to many of the interested parties, it is transparent with less running costs, and most important it takes into account conservation interests (Wildlife Department, 1998).

The second favored method was allocation by the Committee, of which the Director of Wildlife is the Chairman.

The Department's response demonstrates its indifference to the multiple failings of the existing system for hunting block allocation. The truth is that the powerful interests who have benefited so much under a system which the government itself has found to be unjust and inefficient, will stop at nothing to make sure that it remains in place.