ABUSE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL LICENCE

The prevalence of nepotism within the hunting industry is also seen in the issuance of Presidential Licences. As stated above, these are licences issued by the Director of Wildlife, with the approval of the Minister, for any of the reasons stated in Section 41 of the Wildlife Conservation Act. According to this section, the Director has powers to grant any person a presidential licence, with or without a fee, to hunt, capture or photograph the animal specified for the purposes of scientific research, or for display in a museum, zoo, or similar establishment. In addition, the licence can be issued in support of educational activities, cultural activities, as a complimentary gift, or in exchange for food in cases of emergency.

The purpose of the Presidential Licence was to allow shipment of animals to other parts of the world in support of scientific research, and to provide education on the importance of wildlife conservation. However, the only safeguard provided by law against the misuse of this power by the Director is that he must have the approval of the Minister. There is no prohibition against the Director issuing licences to his friends, relatives, the Minister, his official superiors, or to people with whom he or she has business relationships. As a result, the law creates an environment conducive to abuses involving collusion between the Minister and the Director, a possibility confirmed by the findings of the Warioba Commission.

The Commission found the Presidential Licence to be one of the most abused areas of the hunting regulatory structure, establishing that it was regularly issued to people who were friends of the Director and the Minister or who were former holders of these posts. Examples of the Commission's findings included:

• The former Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism, Mr. Juma Hamad Omari was granted three Presidential Licences in 1994. The first one allowed him to hunt two buffaloes, two elands, two impalas, and two harte-beests in the Coast and Morogoro Regions. The second one allowed him to hunt two buffaloes, two elands, two grants, two wildebeests, and two hartebeests in the same regions. Lastly, the third one allowed him to hunt one eland, two wildebeests, three impalas, two hartebeests, and one buffalo in Kingupira area (Tanzania 1996, vol. ii, 410).
• The Commission also found that another Minister, Dr. J. Ngasongwa issued licences to undeserving people such as Brigadier Mohamed Abdulrahim Al-Ali, the Vice-Minister of Defence of the United Arab Emirates. The latter was granted a Presidential Licence to hunt one buffalo and thirty sand grouse, despite the fact that the said Brigadier had already been granted hunting rights elsewhere, in the Loliondo area, for the unprecedented term of ten years! This grant of a Presidential Licence deprived the government of revenue while gaining the nation no compensating benefit.

The law on Presidential Licences has several other flaws. First, it does not require the Director to conduct a vigorous examination of the applicants' authenticity and credibility. It is imperative, for example, that the Director ascertain whether the person or organization applying for a licence for zoological purposes has all the facilities, knowledge, and expertise necessary to keep the animal in question in good conditions. Without this requirement, animals might be given to people who have no interest at all in keeping them for the benefit of humanity.

Second, the fact that the Director may, at his discretion, issue a Presidential Licence with or without a fee lends itself to corruption and abuse. While issuing such a licence without a fee might be justifiable during a time of emergency, it does not make sense in other circumstances. Its effect is to deny Tanzania revenue necessary for wildlife management.

Finally, the Presidential Licence creates the legal basis for the "blanket nullification" of the fundamentals of sound wildlife management and protection. It enables its recipients to hunt and capture animals in total disregard of other provisions of the Wildlife Act or of any other written law, which if broadly interpreted could include even those international treaties that Tanzania has ratified. The general import of the licence is summed up in these words:

Thus the law does not require the Director of Wildlife to satisfy him or herself that there are enough animals to warrant their hunting, allowing the capture of animals that would have otherwise been protected because of legal bans or restrictions. In effect, the Presidential Licence prevents the establishment of a well-considered and consistently enforced quota system and compromises the capacity of Tanzania's system of consumptive wildlife utilization capacity to achieve both conservation and financial goals. It is to this issue we now turn.