THE LACK OF BENEFIT SHARING

Another area of concern is the continued exclusion of contiguous communities from wildlife management. The government of Tanzania has been reluctant to involve them even though the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974, broadly interpreted, allows contiguous communities to be involved in consumptive utilization under the banner of authorized association. Under Section 26 (1) of the Act the minister responsible for wildlife is empowered to declare any body or persons, whether body corporate or unincorporate, or any ujamaa village to be such an authorized association. It is well-established that involving contiguous communities not only increases the number of people protecting wildlife but also results in a dramatic reduction in poaching. Furthermore, these communities possess valuable knowledge concerning wildlife that can be used by the authorities to foster sound management. Instead, the government continues to view these contiguous communities as dangerous to the animals and assumes that the only way to protect wildlife is by wholesale eviction of these communities from lands adjacent to protected areas. This tendency is exemplified by the government's recent attempts evict to well-established local communities in the Mkomazi Game Reserve of the Wamasai in response to a decline in wildlife numbers.

In theory, one of the criteria that an outfitter must meet to receive hunting privileges is a plan to integrate its conservation activities with that of the contiguous communities. Although this requirement is in principle sound, in practice it is poorly observed because there is no provision for its implementation. In most cases, outfitters think this requirement can be met by digging one or two boreholes for the villagers. Rather than creating an environment conducive to productive cooperation, the present system only demands the delivery of handouts to villages. This has led to the exclusion of the contiguous communities from involvement in wildlife protection by both the government and the outfitters.

In 1993, the government committed itself to transfer 25 percent of the revenue from hunting to the areas where hunting activities actually take place. While potentially a move in the right direction, in reality this money never reaches the actual villages or communities, instead ending up with the district council. This has fostered distrust of the government among rural populations, who feel that they are being cheated and that the benefits of wildlife utilization are reserved only for the elite and for foreigners.

One example of the disregard official structures have typically shown for the need to safeguard local interests took place in Loliondo, Ngorongoro district. In November 1992, the Ngorongoro District Council entered into an agreement with Brigadier Mohamed Abdulrahim Al-Ali for him to conduct tourist hunting in six villages in the district. The District Council entered into the agreement purportedly on behalf of these villages, but in fact, it never even consulted with them, despite the fact that hunting was to take place in village lands held under customary land rights. In the contract, the Brigadier was given carte blanche to hunt in the area in return for donating a token part of his revenue - at his discretion - toward school and dispensary renovations. The agreement did not obligate the Brigadier to pay a certain percentage of money annually to each village government. Unlike other hunting companies, whose tenure within each hunting block is five years, the Brigadier was given a ten-year permit. Despite vigorous protests about this agreement and allocation by the public, the media, and a parliamentary probe team popularly known as the Marmo Commission, this agreement remains in force.

Wildlife authorities in Tanzania cannot and should not continue to ignore the immense potential ontribution contiguous people have to make to management efforts. Their deliberate exclusion has led to massive poaching and inadequate protection of wildlife.