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Picking Winners … and Counting LosersThere had apparently been great expectations in high circles within the Government that the NEMC coordinated review team would see where the wind was blowing and produce a report favourable to the Government. After all, NEMC comes directly under the administrative ambit of the Vice President's Office and the Vice President had, more than any other Government figure, been in the forefront in support of the prawn project. In the event, however, these expectations were dashed. Retribution came swiftly. NEMC's Director General who had, before and throughout the controversial EIA processes, been acting in that capacity was not confirmed in that position and was later removed from NEMC altogether. But the stakes much higher. As is well known in Tanzanian environmental management circles, the issue of perceived conflict and or overlap in powers and functions and the ensuing power struggle between NEMC and the Division of Environment (DoE) under the Vice President's Office has been the subject of great controversy ever since DoE was created in 1990. As opposed to NEMC which was created by statute1, DoE was created neither by statute nor by any presidential instrument. Rather it was created administratively as a department within the then Ministry of Tourism, Natural Resources and Environment (MTNRE), and later transferred to the Vice President's Office. The result is that, as the LEAT study cited above reveals, "… the law has continued to be completely silent not only about the existence of the DoE, but also its powers, functions and responsibilities" (LEAT, 1999: 16). DoE has all the same been exercising substantially similar powers and functions as NEMC's, thus causing continuous institutional rivalries. Given the difficult position that NEMC found itself in after resisting attempts to have it legitimize the Rufiji Delta project, DoE tried to capitalize on this by delivering a crippling blow to NEMC's future existence. It did this by manipulating the environmental policy making processes which were then going on to position itself as the only environmental institution within the VPO. In December 1997, barely a month after the Cabinet approval of the prawn project, the National Environmental Policy (NEP) was also approved by the Cabinet (Tanzania, 1997a, passim.) Chapter Five is particularly instructive in as far as its proposed institutional arrangements for environmental management in Tanzania seek to significantly redraw the environmental management institutional power map. It proposes an institutional set up under which environmental management powers will be concentrated within in the Division of Environment (op.cit., paras. 88 to 90). DoE shall, for instance, provide policy and technical backup; execute the oversight mandate of the Ministry (i.e., VPO); undertake policy analysis and develop policy choices for decision-making; coordinate broad-based environmental programmes, plans and projects; develop guidelines and criteria for EIA, environmental standards, national plans, strategies and programmes, etc. (op. cit., paras. 91 and 92). There are also extensive provisions in respect of the proposed functions of unspecified 'lead ministries' and 'advisory bodies' (op. cit., paras. 94 to 99); and local authorities and 'committees on the environment' (op. cit., paras. 101 to 104). Perhaps not unexpectedly, NEP proposes - in two sentences - that NEMC "shall retain its advisory role" and "… enforce pollution control and perform the technical arbitration role in the undertaking of Environmental Impact Assessment"! (op. cit., para. 100). In December 1997 - the same month that the Environmental Policy was approved - a document entitled the "Functions and Organization Structure of the Vice President's Office" prepared by the Vice President's Office was approved by the Civil Service Department of the President's Office. Apparently taking its cue from NEP, this document proposes that all environmental powers and functions within the Vice President's Office be vested in the DoE which shall henceforth be the sole environmental institution within the VPO. In the new scheme of things envisaged by this document, the latter shall be responsible for environmental policy making; environmental coordination and monitoring; environmental planning; and policy-oriented environmental research (para. 3.1.3, p. 4). Within these core functions, according to this document, there are "substantive areas of concern" which shall also fall under the ambit of DoE, namely environmental conservation, environmental pollution, environmental impact assessment and environmental education (para. 4.1, p. 12). The only reference about NEMC in the entire document concerns the proposed EIA Section within DoE one of whose functions shall be to evaluate and offer "professional advice" on activities undertaken by NEMC (para. 4.1.3)! The tenor and general thrust of the NEP and the proposed functions and organizational structure of the VPO is, therefore, in the general direction of gradually phasing NEMC out and its replacement by DoE. It should not come as a surprise to learn that DoE - the chief beneficiary of the policy proposals - was also the chief architect of both the NEP and the organizational structures document. It has now come to light that the entire policy process was "usurped" by DoE contrary to law2. DoE commissioned an NGO to prepare a National Environmental Policy Workshop whose proceedings formed the basis for the drafting of the policy document. It also commissioned a local consulting firm to prepare the draft of the Policy3. It is now also known that the Director of Environment himself chose the opportunity to send the draft policy to the Cabinet for adoption when he was acting as Permanent Secretary in the Vice President's Office! It is further known now that the institutional structures proposed in the NEP are inconsistent with the directives of the Cabinet and even the specific orders of the President. It would appear that even though NEMC found itself in an unenviable situation of having embarrassed the Government over the Rufiji Delta Prawn Farming Project, the latter was not as yet prepared to take the drastic step of consigning the former to the dustbin of history. On 13th October 1997, Cabinet Paper No. 40 of 1997 relating to the Draft National Environmental Policy was submitted to the Cabinet for deliberation and adoption. After wide-ranging discussion on the various aspects of the Draft Policy, the Cabinet observed, in respect of institutional structures for environmental management, that "… (t)oo many committees have been enumerated to coordinate the implementation of the National Environmental Policy and this might affect the implementation of the Policy due to bureaucracy." It consequently directed that "… these committees be reexamined with a view to striking them off at the national level and thereby remain only with the National Environment Management Council (NEMC)"! (Quoted in LEAT, ibid., 99). The record of the Cabinet shows that President Mkapa "accepted that advice and directed its implementation." The Cabinet's decision was communicated to Mr. E. Mugurusi, the Director of Environment, in a letter dated 20 November 1997 which stated, among others, that "… your Department in collaboration with all others concerned should see to it that these decisions are implemented and that the final draft of the Policy is ready for formal adoption…."4 Looking at the NEP as it stands, there is no doubt that the Cabinet directives were not implemented. It is also clear that the directives of the Cabinet were ignored as a result of a self-serving attempt to exploit the unfavourable situation NEMC found itself in vis a vis the government after the Rufiji Delta Project controversy. The powers that be must have known that NEMC will probably have few, if any, defenders in the high circles of the government. They must also have banked on the possibility that the Cabinet would not make any follow up of its directives in order to see whether they have been implemented. In this they may have been correct: The NEP version that has been widely circulated by DoE is substantially the same as the draft that was sent to the Cabinet, particularly in the areas that the Cabinet had directed to be changed.
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