ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROJECTS

A Study in the Law, Policy and Governmental Decision-making in Tanzania

bulletIntroduction
bulletList of Statutes, Cases and Acronyms
bulletPart I. EIA in Tanzania's Environmental Law and Policy
bulletExpansive Policy Rhetoric
bullet...and Legislative Foot-dragging
bulletThe Section Proposes...
bulletEIA Regime under the Mining Act, 1998
bullet...and the Proviso Disposes
bulletNEMC's EIA Guidelines and Procedures
bulletPublic Participation under the Guidelines and Procedures
bulletAccess to Information
bulletPart II. Power Politics and EIA in Practice
bulletCase Study 1: Lessons from Rufiji Delta
bulletThe Rufiji Delta Prawn Farming Project
bulletControversy Over EIA
bulletContradictory Advice
bulletArms for What?
bulletThe Cabinet Decision
you are hereGovernment Intransigence
bulletThe Government and the Investor
bulletPicking Winners...and Counting Losers
bulletCase Study 2: EIA in National Parks
bulletConclusions
bulletRecommendations
bulletBibliography

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Government Intransigence

Once made public in the media, the government's approval of the prawn project was greeted with incredulity and sheer disbelief. Criticism in the mass press was strident. In choosing to ignore all the scientific studies and findings of its own experts, the government was accused of sanctioning the project in order to serve the interests of a few individuals at the expense of the national interest. The Government was also accused of misleading the public in its claim that, because the project would be semi-intensive rather than intensive, Tanzania could avoid the disastrous consequences of prawn farming elsewhere. The propriety of the Cabinet making decisions on such issues as this project was likewise questioned. For their part, local communities in the Delta decided to file a suit in the High Court to challenge the decision to approve the Project1.

In spite of such concerns, the government has maintained its support for the project. On 24th January 1998, the Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism, Zakia Meghji, told the press that the Government would not reverse its approval of the project and maintained that the project's endorsement by the Cabinet was final. However, the Minister added that the Government would take a number of measures to ensure that the project did not cause environmental destruction. In particular, the Government would require the investor to submit a programme of action with more meaningful mitigation measures than those proposed in the original EIA. Such intransigence requires an explanation. Why, for example, did the Government choose to override the recommendations of its own review team? Why did it ignore the wealth of evidence (which it agreed was valid) showing that the project was neither environmentally defensible nor socially and economically justifiable? Why did it decide to go against the express interests of the people it so often proclaims to safeguard and uphold? And why did it show so little regard for the legality of the project? These issues are dealt with in the next part.


  1. Up to the writing of this brief, the High Court sitting in Dar es Salaam had issued an order of interim injunction restraining AFC from carrying out any developments in the project area pending the determination of an application for temporary injunction by the petitioners.