Arms for What?: Environmental Impact Assessment of Foreign Investment Projects

Not all those in government went along with the recommendations of the Vice-President's Office, however. In particular, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives expressed grave concerns about the fate of those who would be evicted as a result of the project, raising disturbing questions - as yet unanswered - about the intentions behind the AFC's proposed budget for the purchasing of arms: "The issue of AFC buying armaments to the tune of US$ 570,000 per annum shows how the investor is preparing for a showdown with the local people who will be evicted from their lands should they ever try to reclaim their ancestral lands. In general the Ministry feels that granting an investor (and especially a foreign national) more than 10,000 hectares of land which is occupied and owned by the people is to violate the fundamental right of the people. In order to avoid unnecessary conflicts it is better for this project not to be approved until such time that the land use plan for the Rufiji Delta being prepared now with IUCN's support is completed" [MAC, 1997, para. 8].

The Ministry went on to argue that due to the many adverse environmental, social and economic impacts of the project, and in spite of the investor's claim that the project would benefit the local people, the project should be rejected, in line with the conclusions of the NEMC report. As the Ministry noted:

"That report did not put any conditions for the project to be approved, unlike the memorandum from the Vice President's Office (paragraph 13). Putting this recommendation in the memorandum of the Vice President's Office is to reveal that the Government lacks a clear position on the whole question of this project which concrete and expert opinion has shown to be 'disqualified' for implementation in this area." [para. 10]

For these reasons, and for reasons "of national interests and those of its people (present and future generations) especially those who live in the Rufiji Delta", the Ministry of Agriculture concluded that:

"Honourable Ministers should properly advise the President to accept the recommendations of paragraph 12 of this (i.e. VPO's) Paper to withhold the approval of the implementation of this project in the Rufiji River Delta."

The Ministry ended its submission by raising the spectre of the Government losing credibility should the project be approved:

"Tanzania respects the rule of law and is governed by it. It seems clear, on the basis of numerous actions which the investor (AFC) has taken, that various provisions of the law have been violated. In order for this project to be implemented without legal and policy problems, the Government should first repeal or amend the laws it has enacted to protect all the areas if this project is to be implemented and not otherwise. The approval or rejection of this project is the bedrock upon which Government's respect of the rule of law shall be tested. This is a very serious matter to the people and the nation as a whole." [ibid., para. 10. All quotations have been freely translated from the Swahili original; emphasis supplied]

The Ministry of Agriculture was not alone in opposing the Rufiji Delta Project. There were others who, like the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) and the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC), had - even before the NEMC's review report was released - taken positions against the implementation of the Project. Their objections were founded on the fact that they had designated Rufiji Delta as an oil exploration block and had already allocated it to two foreign oil prospecting companies for that purpose. It was thought that granting a large chunk of the Delta area to AFC would lead to future land use conflicts as had already happened in several previous cases. These two institutions also questioned AFC's motives in seeking to undertake this project in the Rufiji Delta.