REVIEW OF THE DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS AND IT'S IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN TANZANIA

bulletIntroduction
bulletAbbreviations
bulletLegislation
bulletPART I: Conceptual Framework and Rationale for Decentralization
bullet1.1 Conceptual Framework
bullet1.2 Background to the Environmental Problems Facing in Tanzania
bullet1.3 Major Environmental Problems in Tanzania
bulletPART II: Tanzania's Experience with Decentralization: a Chronology of Events
bullet2.1 Introduction
bullet2.2 Decentralization Process (1972-1982)
bullet2.3 Decentralization Process (1983-1998)
bullet2.4 Local Government Reforms and Environmental Management
bulletPART III: The Policy Reforms and Environmental Management in Tanzania
bullet3.1 Introduction
bullet3.2 National Forestry Policy
bullet3.3 National Environmental Policy
bullet3.5 National Land Policy
bulletPART IV: Environmental Legislation Management by Local Government Authorities in Tanzania
bullet4.1 Introduction
bullet4.2 An Overview of Local Government Authorities
bullet4.3 District Local Government Authorities
bullet4.4 Urban Local Government Authorities
bulletPART V: Factors Hindering Effective Management of the Environment by Local Governement Authorities
bullet5.1 Introduction
bullet5.2 Lack of Property Rights Over Natural Resources
bullet5.3 Weak Formulation and Implementation of Bylaws
bullet5.4 Poor Enforcement of Environmental Laws
you are here5.5 Weak Penalties and Incentives
bulletPART VI: Practical Implications to Decentralize Environmental Management Structures
bullet6.1 Existing Interfaces and Linkages between Local Government Structures
bullet6.2 Capacity of Local Governments In Environmental Management
bulletPART VII: Conclusions and Recommendations
bullet7.1 Conclusions
bullet7.2 Recommendations
bulletReferences

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5.5 Weak Penalties and Incentives

Most legislation is outdated and has inadequate penalties to deter repeat offenders from degrading environment. For example, most of the penalty provisions were enacted in the 1950s and 1960s. And under Section 26 (1) of the Forests Ordinance, Cap 389 that except where another penalty is provided any person who is convicted of an offence under the Ordinance shall be liable to a fine not exceeding Tshs. 3000/= (equivalent to USD 3.72 at the rate of $1= Tshs. 805) or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months.

Another scenario is depicted in the unreported case of Republic vs. Ramla Halfan [Alasiri: 2000]. There, the court found the alleged offender guilty for her failure to keep her cesspit in good order and repair. The court convicted the offender and ordered her to pay a fine of only Tshs. 15,000/= (equivalent to USD $18.63). The latter is so minimal and therefore does not act as deterrent against future violations, instead, it allows violators to profit from their illegal acts. In addition, the low fines discourage prosecutors from prosecuting offenders of environmental violations.