5.1 On the Registrar of NGOs

The preamble to the proposed law admits that the intention of the legislation is to "provide for the registration and regulation" of NGOs. As we seen, this was also the pre-eminent function of the Societies Ordinance Cap. 337. The draft bill proposes the establishment of an Office of the Registrar of Organisations within the Vice-President's Office which shall be responsible for registration of NGOs.¹ In contrast with the final draft of the NGO Policy, which proposes a significant shift in the institutional power structures away from the Registrar and into the hands of a more representative National NGO Coordination Board, the latter body is completely and conspicuously absent in the draft bill.

The draft proposes that the Registrar of Organisations should be assigned the functions of considering and processing applications for registration of NGOs; registering those NGOs which have satisfied the necessary conditions; keeping records and information on NGOs; ensuring that NGOs confine their activities to those permitted by their respective constitutions; considering applications submitted by NGOs seeking assistance from foreign NGOs and institutions; receiving, scrutinizing and approving applications by NGOs for tax relief; and liaising with the minister responsible for NGO affairs on all matters related to registration, functions, operations and deregistration of NGOs.²

Many of these responsibilities are currently assigned to the Registrar of Societies in Tanzania Mainland under the Societies Ordinance and in the Isles under the Societies Act No. 16 of 1995. The proposals, however, further strengthen the Registrar's role. As I have argued above, the requirements for the submission of audited financial reports was one of the instruments of control established by the Societies Ordinance. Clause 18(2) of the proposed legislation tightens the government's financial control over NGOs in two crucial respects: firstly, by requiring NGOs to seek the Registrar's approval in applying for funding from international organisations; and secondly, by assigning the Registrar powers to receive, scrutinize and approve applications for tax reliefs for NGOs. These provisions give the Registrar powerful weapons to punish NGOs critical of government policies and reward pliant ones; they could well spell the end of the many NGOs that cannot survive without foreign financial support and/or tax exemption. It is not difficult to imagine the potential for patronage, favouritism and corruption inherent in the exercise of this power.

Clearly there is a real need for NGOs to disclose internal financial information, as it is in the interests of the public to know the sources of funds of their organisations and how they are utilised. He who pays the piper calls the tune, as a saying goes, and therefore financial reports of these organisations should be made public so that all can see who is financing which organisations and on what basis. The people have a right to know the strings, if any, attached to the financing of NGOs both locally and internationally. However, there is no reason why the government should demand preferential treatment on this question, or be able to use its powers of financial supervision to control NGOs' activities.

To carry out these functions, the proposed law gives the Registrar of Organisations powers to grant or refuse applications for registration; to demand submission of records and information on their operations; and to require NGOs seeking registration to amend, vary or replace any article or any part in their respective constitutions which appears to the Registrar to be violative of any written law or inconsistent with the NGO Policy.³ The Registrar is, furthermore, proposed to have "all powers which are necessary for the carrying into effect of the purposes of this Act."⁴ This open-ended provision is likely to give the Registrar a carte blanche to deal with NGOs deemed to be a threat to the status quo. Again, the potential for abuse of these powers is considerable, negating the aspects of the final draft policy which seek to curb the powers of the executive.

In one respect only are the proposed law's provisions for the powers and responsibilities of the Registrar an improvement on the present regime: in its provisions for the expediting of the registration process. Part III of the bill, obliges the Registrar to respond within thirty days from the date an application for registration is submitted to him.⁵ Failure to do so within the prescribed time would entitle the founder members of the particular NGO to conduct activities as if the application for registration had been granted.⁶ Furthermore, an application by registered mail shall be conclusive evidence that the application was sent to the Registrar on the date embossed on it.⁷ These are welcome provisions, as they are obviously intended to cut down on the notorious red tape and bureaucratic foot-dragging that has historically characterized the procedures for registration of NGOs under the current dispensation. The streamlining of the registration process is, as we have seen, also a feature of the proposed policy.

1. Draft NGO Bill 1998, cl. 3(1)(2).
2. Ibid., cl. 6. This provision has to be read together with clause 18 of the proposed legislation which imposes various duties on NGOs including financial reporting.
3. Ibid., cl. 7(1). This provision is particularly ironic, given the fact that as we have considered above, granting the Registrar such powers is itself a direct violation of the proposed NGO Policy.
4. Ibid., cl. 7(2).
5. Ibid., cl. 13(1).
6. Ibid., cl. 13(2).
7. Ibid., cl. 13(3).